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Abstract 
A defining characteristic of the emergence of new organizational landscapes is that information 
is not just being used as a tool by organizations, as it is more usually understood, but also as a 
weapon in a ‘war of position’. As organizations seek to influence public perception over such 
emotive issues as climate change, conflict at the ideational level can give rise to information 
warfare campaigns. This concerns the creation and deployment of often ideologically-infused 
ideas through information networks to promote an organization’s interests over those of its 
adversaries. In this article, we analyse the ways in which ExxonMobil and Greenpeace employ 
distinctive informational tactics against a range of diverse targets in their dispute over the 
climate change debate. The purpose of this article is to advance the neo-Gramscian perspective 
on social movement organizations as a framework for understanding such behaviour. We argue 
that information warfare is likely to become common as corporations and non-governmental 
organizations are increasingly sensitive to their informational environment as a source of both 
opportunity and possible conflict.  
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Introduction 
This article investigates the informational tactics employed by ExxonMobil and 
Greenpeace in their battle to win the climate change debate. It focuses on the extent to which 
information has been employed as a disruptive weapon, rather than as a tool used for 
productive purposes as it is more usually understood in organization theory. Notions of 
‘information warfare’ have become a fertile area for theorizing in computer studies (Denning, 
1999) and military strategy (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997a, 2001; Knott, 2007; Libicki, 2007), 
and there is also an emerging literature developing within the social sciences (Terranova, 2004, 
2007; Virilio, 2000, 2002). In both military and social conflicts, communication and 
information systems are increasing the ability of small groups and individuals to confront much 
larger entities through a range of guerrilla tactics, be they companies, militaries or governments 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997). We argue here that as information warfare gains currency in the 
civilian realm it is being waged increasingly by organizations such as NGOs, but importantly 
also by corporations to both defend against perceived threats and to take advantage of 
identified opportunities arising from their informational environments. 
 An increased concern with such information warfare tactics corresponds with the rise 
of the so-called network society (Castells, 1996, 2001).  The network society is characterized 
by the increasing use of distributed networks, most notably the Internet and the World Wide 
Web. This enables small groups of media savvy ‘information fighters’ (Birnbaum, 2005) to 
have disproportionate influence over public perception, government planning and business 
policy. Comparatively poorly resourced social movement organizations have been keen to 
exploit the advantages offered by modern communication networks (Castells, 2001; Davis & 
Zald, 2005; Derville, 2005; Heath, 1998; Levy & Newell, 2002). Likewise, companies 
threatened by the public pillory over the impact of their operations on, for instance, climate 
change, have responded by developing their own information warfare tactics including 
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financing networks of loosely affiliated organizations to fight proxy information wars in 
pursuit of their strategic interests. We show in this article that such tactics have been used 
extensively by ExxonMobil and Greenpeace, the world's largest oil company and one of its 
major critics, in their climate change dispute. 
The nascent literature addressing organizational responses to such issues as climate 
change, we suggest, has paid insufficient attention to theorizing the specific nature of the 
informational strategies and tactics that have been used to legitimize and delegitimize the 
framing of the climate change debate. Scholars of organization theory have demonstrated how 
a neo-Gramscian approach can be fruitful for analysing controversial issues such as climate 
change in terms of strategic ‘wars of position’ (e.g. Levy & Egan, 2003; Levy & Scully, 2007). 
Related social movement organizational theory has drawn attention to the use of networks to 
disseminate messages, but they have yet to elaborate the precise nature of such informational 
skirmishes between ideologically opposed organizations (e.g. Banerjee, 2003; Boykoff, 2009; 
Levy & Egan, 2003; Levy & Kolk, 2002; Levy & Newell, 2002; Okereke, 2007; Wittneben, 
2007). We address this gap here by combining insights from information warfare and social 
movement theory to develop a theoretical framework that explains the informational 
campaigns employed by some organizations in relation to climate change.  
A study by Levy and Kolk (2002) into the ‘strategic responses to global climate 
change’ of the four oil super majors (i.e. ExxonMobil, Royal/Dutch Shell, Chevron-Texaco 
and British Petroleum (BP)) found that a diverse range of environmental strategies were 
employed by the four companies. On the one hand, BP was broadly supportive of climate 
science and advocated precautionary action, such as investment in renewables, as did Shell and 
Texaco. On the other hand, ExxonMobil adopted a political strategy of fighting tighter 
environmental regulation. Organizational responses to the risks associated with climate change 
thus range from cooperation to conflict (Levy & Egan, 2003). Research shows that variance in 
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the climate change policies of different oil companies depends upon whether the company’s 
management views it as a real net cost to the company or a ‘culturally relevant cost’ (Beale & 
Fernando, 2009, p.29).  
More recently it appears that there has been some convergence with the climate change 
strategies of the oil majors, with some pulling back from commitments to develop alternative 
energy sources and similar environmentally friendly policies, retrenching in their traditional oil 
and gas businesses, while others are adopting more conciliatory positions on issues such as 
climate change. For instance, BP shut down its stand-alone Alternative Energy head office in 
2009 and was responsible for the 2010 Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Similarly, Shell has been cutting back its investments in renewables with the sale of solar 
power divisions in 2006 and 2007. ExxonMobil, by contrast, has traditionally taken up one of 
the most overtly hostile stances towards the climate change debate. It has thus become, 
unsurprisingly, a chief target of environmental NGOs like Greenpeace resulting in highly 
adversarial positions. In 2008, however, ExxonMobil pledged to stop funding climate change 
deniers and it has now adopted energy efficiency as a marketing position (see ExxonMobil, 
2012; Wittneben, 2009). While ExxonMobil has adopted an outwardly softer ‘climate friendly’ 
discursive strategy, debate continues concerning the extent to which this is genuinely the case 
(New York Times, 1st Jul 2011; The Independent 7th February 2010; Greenpeace, 2011).  
In this article we examine the information campaigns employed by the oil giant 
ExxonMobil and the environmental NGO Greenpeace. Our aim is to show how these two 
organizations deploy a number of informational tactics against each other in a ‘war of position’ 
to alter the public’s perception over this controversial issue. The article begins by advancing a 
neo-Gramscian perspective on social movement theory by drawing on concepts of information 
warfare. It then develops an empirical case study identifying the tactics of information and 
misinformation employed by ExxonMobil and Greenpeace with respect to the climate change 
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debate. These tactics are analysed in terms of the concept of information warfare, highlighting 
the way in which the debate over climate change is framed by these organizations and, more 
specifically, the ways in which the different sources of information involved in this debate 
have become an object of attack and defence. Following this we develop a fine-grained 
analysis of the specific tactics, targets and methods identified in the case study to make a 
conceptual contribution to social movement organizational theory by developing Gramsci’s 
idea of a ‘war of position’ in terms of a tactical information war. In the next section we turn to 
our theoretical overview.   
 
Theoretical Overview: Information Warfare and Organizations  
 The manipulation of the public’s perception of important social issues has long been a 
concern for scholars of issues management and public relations (Crable & Vibbert, 1985; 
Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Jones & Chase, 1979). To a certain extent it could be argued that 
the debate over information warfare is little more than old wine in new bottles. The theorists 
who developed the concept of information warfare have openly acknowledged the important 
role of techniques such as public relations and propaganda in their development of this concept 
(Arquilla & Rondfelt, 1997; Denning, 1999; Terranova, 2007).  
Tsoukas (1999, p.500) has argued that, ‘in late modernity, the organizational 
environment increasingly consists of signs, namely mediated images, symbols, and knowledge 
claims’. When issues emerge from a company’s symbolic environment that may influence their 
interests, corporations can respond by using a range of tactics such as public relations events, 
advertising and lobbying (Crable & Vibbert, 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Krippendorff & 
Eleey, 1986). Such purely managerial approaches have clear limitations as frameworks for 
understanding the social world in that they are explicitly defined as a strategic planning tool for 
corporations. For instance, in an analysis of the Brent Spar controversy where Greenpeace 
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activists had protested a decision to sink a defunct Royal Dutch/Shell oil platform in the North 
Sea, Heath (1998, p.275) argued that activist groups manipulated the public’s perception of 
environmental issues and warned that, ‘No entity should dominate the dialogue’. He thus 
recommends that the tools of issues management should be employed by corporations to 
‘balance’ the public’s views.  
Rather than seeing the informational campaigns that originate from environmental 
NGOs as a means of redressing an existing imbalance resulting from corporate sponsored PR, 
the discourse of issues management portrays any critique originating from civil society as 
being itself an ‘imbalance’. Gaunt and Ollenburger (1995, p.200), for example, define the remit 
of issues management stating that it is ‘important for companies to use [issues management] in 
an attempt to counter the efforts of activist groups’. Arguably, these approaches are limited in 
the scope of their analysis by their functionalist presuppositions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
This is because they are premised on unitary assumptions about the nature of the social world 
that tend to underplay any genuine social conflict where activist groups are portrayed simply as 
being mistaken (Livesey, 2002). Furthermore, such approaches present information and 
knowledge as being a kind of democratic tool rather than as being a weapon that may also be 
employed for disruptive purposes.  
The approach of the present study departs from such functionalist perspectives (e.g. 
Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Heath, 1998) by situating informational conflicts within a 
framework that admits to the possibility of a fundamental ideologically-infused conflict on the 
ideational level. Our study is in broad agreement with existing discourse analytic approaches to 
the extent that it focuses on the different forces that contribute to the social construction of the 
climate change issue (e.g. Livesey, 2002; Hajer, 1995), but we differ in the extent to which we 
emphasize the precise tactical aspects of information campaigns to explain the responses of 
some organizations to climate change, which reject the discourse of ‘ecological 
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modernization’ (Hajer, 1995). We therefore examine the climate change debate not simply as a 
discursive construct, but in terms of the way information is deployed as part of an information 
war targeting the public’s perception of the climate change debate (cf. Terranova, 2007).  Such 
a perspective is differentiated markedly from those posited by scholars of discursive politics 
and institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Clemons & Cook, 1999; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et al. 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Phillips et al. 2004) who 
conceive the deployment of informational strategies and tactics largely in terms of reaching 
some accommodation through political contestation and manoeuvring. Information warfare, by 
contrast, implies a privileging of ends over means where political accommodation and 
compromise is supplanted by asymmetric attacks and counter attacks aimed at the discrediting 
or even destruction of an opposing ideology. The possibility of such conflictual or even hostile 
behaviour in which ‘anything goes’ has rarely been considered in organization theory. 
Scholars from diverse fields of studies have observed that the increased importance of 
networks as a medium of organization has in fact led to an intensified use of information 
warfare tactics. Castells’ (2001, p.58) analysis of new social movements concluded that 
‘informational politics naturally leads to the possibility of informational warfare…’ Terranova 
(2007, p.130) has drawn links between older forms of propaganda and perception management 
and more modern techniques of information warfare where there has been,  
‘a mutation introduced by what we might call new techniques of power (public 
relations, advertising, communication management, infotainment) to which 
corresponds another mode of conflict – a regime of information warfare. These 
techniques of power and regimes of warfare express an important mutation in the 
means by which the effect of cultural hegemony is accomplished’.  
The integration of different forms of communicational and informational networks leads to 
forms of information warfare that exceeds the older forms of propaganda in a number of 
 9
important respects. First, there has been a proliferation of alternative communication networks, 
particularly distributed networks, which have been rapidly colonized by existing social 
struggles (Castells, 1997; Zald & Davis, 2005). Tarrrow’s (2011, p.137) comprehensive survey 
of new social movements has observed that, ‘the most dramatic change in social movement 
organizing in the last few decades has been the impact of the Internet and, more generally, of 
electronic communication.’ Second, the wide-scale use of distributed networks has allowed for 
social movement organizations and insurgent organizations to intensify their activities both 
within the virtual world and the real world where both kinds of groups are adopting similar 
informational tactics (Zald & Davis, 2005). Garrett’s (2006) review of existing research in this 
field concluded that there has been a ‘tactical adaptation’ by new social movements to modern 
information technologies, especially in terms of the use of swarming tactics, which make use 
of technology to mobilize protestors rapidly on multiple fronts. Garrett (2006) argues that the 
WTO protests in Seattle, for instance, were marked by the deployment of swarming tactics, 
forms of online activism and a general intensification of traditional disruptive tactics. Third, 
the alternative media of the Internet has given relatively poorly resourced NGOs and social 
movements tactical advantages that they had not previously enjoyed. For instance, the 
environmental movement has benefited from increased tactical advantages in terms of its real-
time global reach and its ability to bypass the traditional mass media. Fourth, within the 
‘semiotic business environment’ the brand image of organizations and their associated 
reputational risks have become increasingly open to informational attacks from both internal 
and external sources including social protest movements (Power, 2007; Tsoukas, 1999). And 
fifth, increasingly information is itself being used as a weapon rather than as a tool. Terranova 
has highlighted the crucial role of images in the tactics of information warfare, describing the 
use of provocative images in propaganda campaigns as the ‘becoming-weapon of the image’ 
(Terranova, 2007, p.130; Mirzoeff, 2005). In particular, she shows how racist media imagery 
 10
has become an informational weapon by highlighting the role of imagery in the racist portrayal 
of groups, notably Islamic groups, who are portrayed as being a threat to the social body. Her 
conception of information warfare is influenced by the works of Mirzoeff and Virilio on post-
modern warfare, which argues that in the perception and determination of targets ‘image is one 
munition among others’ (Virilio, 2002, p.23). In a slightly different vein, Bob Hunter, one of 
the founding members of Greenpeace, described the dramatic images that environmental 
activists create as being ‘media mindbombs’ (Sunday Times May 3rd, 2005).  
Information has thus been conceived as a weapon of disruption that is used in civilian 
struggles, and in which interest extends beyond the military strategists of the RAND 
Corporation (Terranova, 2004, 2007; Virilio, 2000). In the following section we outline how 
the idea of information warfare has developed since its initial conception by the researchers of 
the RAND Corporation and what its significance is for the study of organization. We follow its 
original formulation as a military doctrine and its adaptation for the analysis of conflict in civil 
society. Following from this, we consider how social movement organizations can be more 
fully understood with regard to the specific informational tactics they have developed to carry 
out their strategic aims. 
 
Information Warfare: Cyber Wars and Social Netwars 
 Information warfare was first formulated as a distinct doctrine by researchers at the 
RAND Corporation to refer to the use of network forms of organization in military and civilian 
conflict (Arquilla & Rondfelt, 1997a). This theory provided a key resource for the US 
military’s ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, which attempts to adapt traditional hierarchical 
military structures in order to better exploit the strengths arising from modern information 
technologies. Two of the core ideas of this research are that, i) it takes a network to fight a 
network, where traditional hierarchical organizations are seen as being poorly suited to the 
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contingencies of many modern conflicts, and ii) that communication networks can be both the 
medium and the target of an attack. Information was thus no longer understood as being solely 
a potentially valuable resource, but it was also conceived as being a weapon in its own right.  
RAND analysts Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997a, p.14) defined information warfare very 
broadly as ‘the use of information to impose one’s will upon an adversary’, which they 
maintain is a crucial dimension of modern ‘low intensity’ conflicts, especially with respect to 
their distinctive use of communication networks. The main exemplar drawn on was the 
Zapatista rebel movement in Mexico, which is a social movement organization that evolved to 
represent the rights of local indigenous peoples in the Chiapas region of Mexico. The 
Zapatistas have employed informal local networks in combination with international NGOs 
such as human rights groups and the Internet to disseminate their message. This message 
directly criticizes the reforms that were imposed on peasant farmers in Mexico as a 
consequence of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and challenges the 
portrayal of their struggle in the mass media. The network society theorist Castells (1996, p. 
79) has called these rebels ‘the first informational guerrillas’. Likewise, the RAND analysts 
describe the Zapatista social movement as the pioneers of information warfare. One of the key 
elements of this doctrine is the ‘blurring’ of civilian and military realms. This concept has 
since been applied to non-military settings to describe conflicts between organizations in civil 
society more generally (Denning, 1999; Munro, 2005; Terranova, 2007; Virilio, 2000). Since 
the initial development of these ideas by the RAND researchers, they have been taken up by 
thinkers in a variety of fields of inquiry including computer studies (Denning, 1999), social 
theory (Hardt & Negri, 2004; Terranova, 2004, 2007; Virilio 2000), international relations (Der 
Derian, 2002), and business (McAfee, 2010; Munro, 2005).  
 The diversity of tactics that have been developed for information warfare operations 
involves a wide range of measures including the methods of traditional low technology 
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propaganda and newer high technology methods. Technology-enhanced ‘hi-tech’ weapons are 
generally found within the virtual environment of the Web and include measures such as 
physhing, identity theft, the spread of computer viruses, distributed denial of service attacks, 
blogging and the creation of special issue websites. Traditional ‘lo-tech’ weapons of 
information warfare include pamphleteering, the spread of gossip, rumour and ‘social 
engineering’. In addition, two general forms of information warfare have been distinguished: 
‘cyberwar’ and ‘netwar’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997a, 2001). Cyberwars are concerned with hi-
tech information operations, either to protect proprietary systems or to launch an attack on an 
adversary’s systems. They may involve the use of technology such as communications 
satellites, computer systems, computer viruses, denial of service attacks, identity theft and the 
like. In contrast, social netwars are concerned with broader social uses of information warfare, 
particularly forms of asymmetric warfare. Netwars include the use of both ‘hi-tech’ methods 
and ‘lo-tech’ tactics such as social engineering and the spread of misinformation and 
propaganda in a variety of media.  
The informational campaigns developed by ExxonMobil and Greenpeace that form the 
basis for the present study concern scientific and counter-scientific claims over the causes and 
consequences of climate change (e.g. Beck, 1992, 1995, 1999). They illustrate the evolution of 
a ‘social netwar’ that combines both technology-enhanced ‘hi-tech’ and more traditional ‘lo-
tech’ tactics of information warfare. Hi-tech approaches can be combined with existing lo-tech 
tactics of information warfare to great effect. For instance, one compelling example of the 
combination of traditional informational tactics with high technology techniques of 
information warfare is the release of whistle-blowing material through the Wikileaks website 
(Leigh & Harding, 2011). The Wikileaks organization combines the hi-tech expertise of the 
hackers who developed the software for ensuring a secure and anonymous channel for the 
distribution of important information with the relatively lo-tech ‘human intelligence’ that it 
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receives from both corporate, military and government whistle-blowers. The effects of what 
might be only a small leak of information are greatly amplified when combined with the 
information technology of Wikileaks (Leigh & Harding, 2011).    
 Denning (1999) has argued that the concept of information warfare can potentially be 
applied to even small-scale social interactions such as speech-acts and sloganeering. She has 
shown that within informational environments, words and images can be developed as 
weapons for the purposes of misinformation and perception management. Denning also 
demonstrates a blurring between civilian and military realms in her discussion of a broad range 
of information warfare ‘players’. She identifies six distinct classes of players including 
criminals, corporations, governments, hackers, insiders and terrorists. This categorization 
shows that the tactics of information warfare are being developed and deployed by a variety of 
organizations within civil society which are clearly not military in orientation. The broad 
spectrum of information warfare ‘players’ and tactics is also apparent in the diverse definitions 
of the concept of information warfare that have been developed in both the military and social 
science literatures as we can see from the following range of definitions set out in Table 1.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
While there is not a consensus amongst information warfare theorists on a definitive 
conception of information warfare, there is general agreement that it concerns how people 
orientate themselves in the world in terms of what they believe about themselves and their 
environment. This diverse range of definitions makes clear that information warfare, especially 
‘netwar,’ tends to be orientated around a key issue that is considered to be of fundamental 
importance to a specific group. Examples might include the protection of the rights of 
indigenous peoples, the protection of human rights, the protection of the environment and 
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climate change. Adopting this perspective we argue that a clear connection can be seen 
between new social movements and their concern for important social issues and the concept 
of information warfare. With the possible exception of Castell’s (1996, 1997, 2001) work on 
network societies, this connection has not yet been developed in the social movement 
literature. In the following section we further explore the significance of information warfare to 
organization studies by drawing attention to the role that social movement organizations have 
had as pioneers of netwar and information warfare.  
 
Social Netwars and Environmental Social Movements  
Information and communication technologies have predominantly been conceived as 
either sense-data or as tools in the organization and strategy literatures (e.g. Husted, 2007; 
Porter, 2008, 1985). Increasingly, new technology is allowing information to be used in a 
different way, as a weapon in the tactical armoury of organizational strategy. As a tool, 
information networks have been used to ‘obliterate’ traditional organizational hierarchies 
(Hammer, 1990) and to re-structure corporate supply chains and expand the extent of their 
markets (Porter, 2001). As a weapon, information networks have been used to steal valuable 
intellectual property, to mislead and confuse competitors and adversaries, and to undermine 
and destroy competing information systems (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997; Denning, 2001; 
Munro, 2005). Denning (1999, p.26-27) explains that information warfare is practiced in 
conjunction with market-based strategies by corporations for the following reasons: 
‘They engage in offensive information warfare when they actively seek intelligence 
about their competitors or steal their competitors’ trade secrets through illegal 
means, such as bribing insiders. They sell information about their customers, 
sometimes violating their privacy. They are motivated by money and competitive 
position.’ 
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The use of cyberspace for information operations has become a serious concern for business 
firms. A recent analysis of the development of information warfare by the consultancy firm 
McAfee (2010) has highlighted the oil and gas industry as the most likely business sector to be 
the object of information warfare attacks. Their survey of 600 IT executives found that, ‘The 
most victimized sector was oil and gas, where two thirds of executives report such [distributed 
denial of service] attacks, with one third reporting multiple attacks a month’ (McAfee, 2010, 
p.7). Perhaps of greater significance for the oil industry has been the extensive use of 
information networks by environmental NGOs to mobilize resistance against their activities 
and the rise of networked social movements as a socio-political force more generally (Castells, 
1997, 2001; Davis & Zald, 2005).  
 A diverse range of commentators from sociology and organization theory have 
observed that new social movements such as environmentalism have benefited from the 
adoption of network structures in the furtherance of their agenda (Castells, 1997, 2001; Davis 
& Zald, 2005; Hardt & Negri, 2004; Tarrow, 2011). A common theme of theorists of both 
information warfare and new social movements is that successful social movements have made 
much use of the Internet in the organization and coordination of their activities and as a means 
of subverting the mainstream media to get their own distinctive message across to the public. 
Highly professional environmental NGOs such as the Worldwatch Institute, World Resources 
Institute, World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace International, for example, are thus able to 
dominate the global stage as the articulators of environmental messages and influence the 
framing of the environmental problematique and governmental policy to a global lay public. 
With very effective media strategies and significant investments in scientific and technological 
development programs they are also generators and publicists of scientific knowledge 
themselves (Jamison, 1996). A search on Google for the word ‘Greenpeace’ at the time of 
writing this article returns an impressive 12 million results and the topic of ‘climate change’ 
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itself returns over 65 million results. Greenpeace actively exploits its presence on the Web, 
circulating a regular cyber-activist newsletter and promoting this as a key element of its global 
campaigns (Cyberactivism revolutionizes, Greenpeace Campaigns, Greenpeace Archive 2006). 
Greenpeace boasts that they have over 300,000 cyber-activists involved in a range of different 
environmental campaigns, including campaigns focused on climate change. These new 
networks have proven to be highly significant for environmental NGOs. For example, Carroll 
and Ratner (1999, p.7) have argued that, ‘Greenpeace’s political project has been elaborated 
from its media strategy, rather than vice versa’. They observe that the use of alternative media 
as a platform for their information campaigns has allowed Greenpeace to overcome its existing 
dependence on the mass media and the associated danger that their ecological message might 
become just another form of media ‘infotainment’.   
 Global social movements such as environmentalism are essentially ‘networked social 
movements’, which have attracted large numbers of cyber-activists to promote their cause 
online and in the ‘analogue’ world (Castells, 1997, 2001). Castells explains that, ‘They 
[environmentalists] have used the Internet to coordinate actions and information, and they built 
a permanent network that draws the battle lines of transnational environmental action in the 
Americas in the 1990s. World Wide Web sites are becoming the rallying points for 
environmentalists around the world…’ (Castells, 1997, p.129). The relationship between 
cyber-activism and events in the analogue world is an important aspect of the recent 
development of global social movements. The Internet provides a platform for groups to 
disseminate their message to large numbers of individuals using methods that by-pass the 
mainstream media as well as opening up opportunities to build alliances with like-minded 
groups and individuals around the globe. The question of the extent to which such social 
movements are engaged in a form of rebellion that might be considered in terms of a ‘war’, 
even if only an information war, is the issue to which we shall now turn. 
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Information Warfare as a ‘War of Position’ 
 It is clear that a variety of social movement organizations have exploited the alternative 
communication channels provided by the Internet in pursuit of their strategic aims, whether 
they are insurgent organizations, human rights groups or environmental activists. The tactics 
employed by insurgent organizations such as the Zapatista rebels and those used by other 
social movement organizations such as environmental groups share many similarities, 
particularly regarding their distinctive use of a wide variety of communication technologies in 
the dissemination of their arguments, ideas, ideologies and values. Existing research in both 
organization and social movement theory has argued that the revolution in telecommunications 
and the use of the Internet as a domain of contestation has provided environmental activists and 
their NGOs greater opportunity to tackle their corporate adversaries (Castells, 1997, 2001; 
Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Heath, 1998; Tsoukas, 1999). For instance, Tsoukas’ (1999) 
analysis of the dispute between Shell UK and Greenpeace over the 1995 disposal of the Brent 
Spar oil platform in the North Sea argued that although Greenpeace had far less financial 
resources at its disposal than Shell, it employed superior informational tactics in the 
management of its ‘semiotic business environment.’ Castells (2001, p.164) has argued that the 
new technologies have allowed for ‘levelling the ground of symbolic manipulation’ and thus 
increased the possibilities for democratic action. Others have challenged such claims noting 
that the Internet resembles more a ‘battlefield’ than a democratic polity (Terranova, 2004). In 
this light, it is not surprising that insurgent organizations have appeared as exemplars of new 
social movements, such as the Zapatista rebels in Mexico (Castells, 1997) or the ‘yellow 
revolution’ in Manila (Davis & Zald, 2005). The new informational milieu provided by the 
Internet and its associated technologies has become rapidly populated by insurgent groups and 
other social movements in the pursuit of their strategic interests and these groups have made 
 18
extensive use of new informational tactics in these struggles (Davis & Zald, 2005; Terranova, 
2004).    
 The war metaphor has been drawn upon explicitly by social movement organization 
theories that are influenced by the work of Gramsci (Böhm et al. 2008; Levy & Newell, 2002; 
Levy & Egan, 2003). They describe social movements as being engaged in a ‘war of position’, 
which is orientated around such techniques as persuasion, boycotts and passive resistance, 
rather than being a frontal ‘war of manoeuvre’, which often precedes it (Gramsci, 1971). From 
a Gramscian perspective the outcome of a war of position is a hegemonic order which entails 
the ‘contingent stabilization of socio-economic systems’ (Levy & Scully, 2007, p.972). 
Existing studies within social movement organization theory have drawn upon these concepts 
to explain the activities of environmental social movement organizations. As Levy and Newell 
(2002, p.88) argue: 
‘The concept of ‘war of position’ employed a military metaphor to suggest how 
subordinate groups might avoid a futile frontal assault against entrenched 
adversaries; rather, the war of position constitutes a longer term strategy, 
coordinated across multiple bases of power, to gain influence in the cultural 
institutions of civil society, develop organizational capacity, and so win new allies.’ 
They use this concept to explain the success of comparatively poorly resourced environmental 
NGOs in out-manoeuvring large MNCs in the public perception of climate change, and 
specifically the Kyoto Protocol. In such conflicts international NGOs are viewed as being key 
players, but serve a largely ambivalent role in ideological struggles. On the one hand, 
environmental NGOs serve to mobilize resistance to the hegemonic powers of capital by 
building a counter-hegemony (cf. Gramsci, 1971), but on the other hand, they can also be key 
allies in maintaining the status quo, achieving a degree of hegemonic stability.  
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In the extant organizational literature, ‘wars of position’ are framed in discursive and 
institutional terms of ‘negotiations’ between diverse actors in civil conflicts (e.g. Levy & 
Newell, 2002; Levy & Scully, 2007). Our own analysis of the dynamics of the dispute between 
ExxonMobil and Greenpeace over climate change is in broad agreement with this literature, 
but differs in one important respect; we argue that the tactics of information warfare are a key 
consideration in understanding contemporary wars of position emphasizing the role of conflict 
in such struggles prior to any apparent accommodation between entrenched positions. An 
information warfare perspective allows for processes of negotiation and compromise, but 
explores the possibility that underlying such negotiations we can find deliberate, directed and 
destabilizing tactical attacks upon the information resources of the different parties involved.  
We argue that the tactics of information warfare are a key part of modern wars of 
position, which can be employed to challenge an existing hegemony or to defend against the 
emergence of a counter-hegemony. Terranova (2007) has proposed that the theories of 
hegemony and information warfare are by no means incommensurable and she argues that 
today the ‘terrain of battle’ of wars of position is being gradually displaced by forms of 
information warfare. In a similar approach to the one developed in the present paper, she 
highlights the emergence of tactics of cyberwar and social netwar which are used for ‘the 
degradation of the adversaries’ capacity for understanding their own circumstances’ 
(Terranova, 2007, p.132). Information warfare can thus be understood as one possible strategy 
by which hegemony is either maintained or undermined.  
The outcomes of informational attacks help to ‘frame’ the process of negotiation 
between the various NGOs and other organizations involved, such as corporations. The 
framing process has already been the subject of much debate within the social movement 
literature as being a key characteristic of a war of position (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 
2005; Ryan, 1991). However, there has been little research as of yet devoted to the specific 
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tactics used by organizations that are engaged in such ‘framing contests’ (Carragee & Roefs, 
2004). Social movement scholars have argued that the success of a social movement 
organization is very much determined by their ability to create a frame that resonates with the 
public (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005). The present analysis builds on the existing 
work on frames in their role as ‘symbols and cognitive cues’ (Campbell, 2005 p.49) and ‘action 
orientated sets of beliefs and meanings’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.614), highlighting the 
significance of deliberate sabotage, deception, and disruption of informational resources by the 
parties involved in framing contests. Framing contests involve a broad variety of informational 
tactics, not only to develop partisan frames, but also to attack alternative frames of the climate 
change issue that have been developed by their adversaries. These tactics include the ways in 
which frames are sponsored, and the various ways that the credibility of a particular frame is 
either established, undermined or attacked. The notion of a ‘framing contest’ emphasizes the 
combative nature of the work of social movements, moving away from understanding this as 
some kind of egalitarian negotiation towards one involving fundamental conflict. Carragee and 
Roefs (2004) have observed that in practice framing contests tend to favour political elites, 
which have more resources at their disposal to sponsor their preferred frames. Similarly, Levy 
and Egan (2003, p.812) have noted that this ‘process should not be mistaken for a pluralist 
model in which all actors are equal.’  
Thus, whilst framing contests may take place under the conditions of a democratic 
society, it would be a mistake to view these as taking place within a framework of an open 
democratic debate. In fact, we will see that many framing tactics used by stakeholders are not 
immediately transparent and may be hidden from the public eye. This present inquiry shows 
clearly that underlying the climate change debate, informational tactics are being employed by 
stakeholders to create and defend their preferred frames and to attack the frames of their 
opponents. These tactics will be analysed in greater detail later in the paper in terms of the 
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strategy of the ‘remote guidance of confusion’ (Virilio, 2000). An analysis of these 
informational tactics is crucial in understanding precisely how ‘wars of position’ are being 
fought by modern social movement organizations.  
The focus of the following case is the various informational tactics employed by 
ExxonMobil and Greenpeace, where information is explicitly conceived as either being a 
weapon itself or as being the possible object of an attack. The concept of a war of position used 
by theorists of social movement organizations can thus be enriched by an analysis of the 
specific informational strategies and tactics that are employed in such conflicts. Now that we 
have developed the concept of information warfare in an organizational studies context, we 
shall turn to an elaboration of the case itself.     
 
The ExxonMobil and Greenpeace Climate Change Dispute 
 The following analysis explores the respective information campaigns of the oil 
company ExxonMobil and the environmental group Greenpeace concerning the specific issue 
of climate change. The writing of our case draws on sources from a range of mediums 
including corporate press releases, media reports, public correspondence, leaked memos and 
Internet websites. Our most substantive source of data for the writing of the case study came 
from the full-text dataset of newspaper articles Factiva. Using the interactive search facility our 
search parameters included variations of the key words ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’, 
‘climate change denial’, ‘Greenpeace’ and ‘Exxon’. A second full-text dataset of press 
releases, PRNewswire, was also consulted using the same search parameters. Finally, public 
correspondence (e.g. open letters from the Royal Society, US Congressional Testimony) and 
Internet websites (e.g. www.exxonmobil.com, www.exxonsecrets.org, www.greenpeace.com 
etc.) were referred to.  
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Our initial search resulted in generating a dataset of 1,934 documents, which were then 
filtered for relevance and organized chronologically. This was reduced to a dataset of 400 
documents, which focused on the information campaigns of ExxonMobil and Greenpeace. The 
first stage of analysis involved interrogating the textual evidence for key events in which either 
ExxonMobil or Greenpeace were identified as actors in the climate change debate. This 
enabled us to build a timeline and construct a case study describing interventions by these two 
organizations. The case study provided a contextual overview illustrating the evolution of this 
dispute between these two organizations over time, thus providing the basis for a more granular 
analysis in the second stage. The second step in the analysis of the textual evidence, therefore, 
involved the identification of particular informational tactics employed by each organization, 
where information was being used as a disruptive tactic or a defence against such disruptive 
tactics within broader climate change organizational strategies. Note that we maintain the usual 
distinction between strategy and tactics where tactics are the particular means for carrying out 
the broader ends defined by an organization’s strategy. Specific instances of information 
warfare were then identified in an iterative process of moving between concepts outlined in the 
previous section and our data-set (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For both 
organizations we identified a broad range of tactics for achieving their strategic objectives. 
They included approaches that we are already familiar with from studies of issues management 
and public relations (e.g. Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Crable & Vibbert, 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 
1999; Jones & Chase, 1979; Krippendorff & Eleey, 1986), as well as a range of approaches 
consistent with concepts of information warfare, which exploited the alternative media of the 
Internet and were used in a limited way by ExxonMobil and far more extensively by 
Greenpeace.  
The purpose of our case study of the dispute between Exxon and Greenpeace is to 
illustrate the specific tactics of information warfare introduced in this article, thereby extending 
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the neo-Gramscian perspective on social movement theory. We acknowledge the usual 
limitations of single-context, case-based research regarding the generalizability of such 
findings, but we believe that the general message of our study, which is that information 
warfare is becoming a feature of emerging organizational landscapes, is transferable to other 
contexts. In the following section we present the results of our analysis, highlighting particular 
instances of information warfare and in each instance making clear the specific tactics 
employed in the campaign, the intended targets of the tactics and the reactions subsequent to 
their deployment. Before proceeding with this analysis we shall provide some background to 
the two organizations that are the focus of this study. 
 
Case overview  
ExxonMobil is one of the world’s largest companies with total revenue of $383,43 
billion in 2010 (ExxonMobil, 2010, p.31). Founded by John D. Rockefeller in 1870 as 
Standard Oil, and with a head office in Irving Texas and operations spanning the world over, 
ExxonMobil produces a range of products including fuels, petrochemicals and lubricants and 
specialities. ExxonMobil describes itself as being ‘the world’s largest publicly traded 
international oil and gas company’ (ExxonMobil, 2008). ExxonMobil donated more than half 
of a planned $USD100 million investment to Stanford University’s Global Climate and Energy 
Project along with donations from other corporate partners such as General Electric, 
Schlumberger and Toyota (ExxonMobil, 2012; GCEP, 2012). It has been criticized for its 
funding of organizations producing research that denies a connection between climate change 
and human activity. These criticisms do not just come from environmental groups, but also 
from prestigious scientific bodies such as the Royal Society (Ward, 2006) and even some of its 
oldest shareholders, the Rockefellers, have held the company to account for their position on 
climate change (Krauss, 2008; McNulty, 2008; Rockefeller & Snowe, 2006). 
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Greenpeace, by contrast, is an international environmental group with gross annual 
income from fundraising of $296 million in 2010 (Greenpeace, 2010, p.26). With regional 
offices in numerous countries around the world, and an international head office in 
Amsterdam, Greenpeace is a global organization. Founded in Vancouver, Canada, in 1971, it 
describes itself as a ‘global campaigning organization that acts to change attitudes and 
behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment, and to promote peace’ (Greenpeace, 
2008). While its methods include funding research and conventional lobbying, its activist 
strategy, occasionally criticized for being too radical, is to employ a range of non-violent, 
direct action tactics, such as confrontations with fishing trawlers on the high seas, or occupying 
oil platforms. These tactics are designed to reduce complex issues into news-friendly images, 
sounds and text that are then disseminated through the global media as what journalist and 
founding member Bob Hunter has termed ‘mind bombs’ (Greenpeace, 2005). Hunter’s 
terminology is revealing in its explicit recognition of the fact that information is used by 
Greenpeace as a weapon. 
Recently, ExxonMobil has come under public pressure over its funding of non-
governmental organizations, politicians and scientists sceptical of the risks posed by climate 
change (Adam, 2006; Gunther, 2007; Krauss, 2008; McNulty, 2008; Rockefeller & Snowe, 
2006). Greenpeace has been instrumental in catalysing this pressure mounted against 
ExxonMobil. We shall now turn to an analysis of the various informational techniques 
employed by these organizations in this dispute in terms of the tactics of information warfare. 
 
i) ExxonMobil’s Response to the Kyoto Protocol 
 The dispute over climate change between Greenpeace and ExxonMobil originates with 
the latter’s hostile stance to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. ExxonMobil’s first systematic campaign 
to engage with the public’s perception of climate science began in 1989 when it joined an 
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industry lobby group called the Global Climate Coalition. This lobby group was formed 
immediately after the United Nations created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Prior to the 1997 meeting of governments in Kyoto to discuss the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, this industry lobby group spent $13 million on 
advertising in the USA. This was aimed at directing public opinion against the Kyoto Protocol, 
using emotive messages such as, ‘America has signed many treaties… but never a treaty of 
surrender’ (quoted in Davies, 2008, p.187; New York Times 24 April 2009). In 1998, following 
the abandonment of the Global Climate Coalition by BP, Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco, 
ExxonMobil formed a task force called the Global Climate Science Team. A leaked memo 
revealed that their purpose was to manufacture uncertainty over climate science by investing 
millions of dollars in orchestrating a disinformation campaign through a network of 
ideologically driven advocacy groups and public relations partners. In addition, between 2000 
and 2005, ExxonMobil gave over $4 million in campaign donations in the United States, 
gaining a spot on the Energy Task Force set up by the Bush Administration and led by Vice 
President Dick Cheney (UCS, 2007). 
 
ii) The Greenpeace Reaction to ExxonMobil 
 In April of 2001, Greenpeace Directors sent letters requesting clarification from 
ExxonMobil’s Executives on their stance on climate change. Greenpeace has claimed that 
ExxonMobil referred them to their advertising campaign running in the United States 
denouncing the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Greenpeace responded by organizing a 
global movement to boycott ExxonMobil’s products and to protest their stance on climate 
change. 
      In May 2002 Greenpeace published a report entitled ‘Denial and deception: A chronicle 
of ExxonMobil’s corruption of the debate on climate change.’ In the report, Greenpeace 
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attempted to expose the role that ExxonMobil was playing directly in climate change policy 
and particularly with government’s stance on the Kyoto Protocol. In an interview with Chief 
Executive Magazine in October 2002, Lee Raymond, the CEO of ExxonMobil was quoted as 
saying ‘The mainstream of some so-called environmentalists or politically correct Europeans 
isn’t the mainstream of all scientists or the White House. The world has been a lot warmer than 
it is now and it didn’t have anything to do with carbon dioxide.’ In May 2003, Greenpeace 
released a spoof of ExxonMobil’s annual report, prompting widespread media coverage. 
ExxonMobil responded in July 2003 by filing an injunction on Greenpeace’s protests on their 
property that had been mobilised as a direct action against ExxonMobil’s climate change 
stance and sought compensation for damages to their trademark, a legal tactic they employed in 
France in 2002. Again in May 2004, Greenpeace engaged in direct action by trying to pressure 
ExxonMobil shareholders by projecting 100-foot images onto the building where there was 
about to be a meeting for ExxonMobil’s shareholders. These images showed the harmful 
effects of global warming including storms and floods. In February 2005, in a dinner to honour 
ExxonMobil CEO Lee Raymond, Greenpeace protestors again engaged in direct action 
disrupting the dinner, dumping red wine on the tables and calling Raymond the ‘No.1 climate 
criminal’ (Wall Street Journal 15 June 2005). 
 
iii) ExxonMobil funding of NGOs dedicated to climate change denial 
 Whilst the lobby group Global Climate Coalition was disbanded in 2002, ExxonMobil 
continued to support a network of advocacy organizations and lobbyists that deny the existence 
of climate change and man-made climate change. The kinds of organizations sponsored by 
ExxonMobil are not scientific centres for the study of climatology, but are mainly lobby groups 
and policy think-tanks such as the American Council for Capital Formation, the Fraser 
Institute, the Center for Policy Research, the George C. Marshal Institute, Competitive 
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Enterprise Institute, the Centre for the Defence of Free Enterprise, the American Legislative 
Exchange Council, the Frontiers of Freedom Institute and Foundation, the Centre for the New 
Europe, the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, and the International Policy Network. In 
their database, Greenpeace documents a range of detailed information regarding this network 
of organizations. Take one organization as an example, the Competitive Enterprise Institute 
(CEI), who are known for describing climate change as a myth and running television 
advertisements in May of 2006 advocating the catch-phrase ‘Carbon dioxide: They call it 
pollution. We call it life’ (Competitive Enterprise Institute, 2006). The Institute referred to the 
work of Curt Davis, the director of the Centre for Geospatial Intelligence at the University of 
Missouri-Columbia. In a much cited press release this is how Professor Davis explained the 
reference to his work by the producers of these adverts: ‘These television ads are a deliberate 
effort to confuse and mislead the public about the global warming debate … They are 
selectively using only parts of my previous research to support their claims. They are not 
telling the entire story to the public’ (News Bureau, University of Missouri, 2006).  
 
iv) Greenpeace reveals ExxonMobil’s tactics and counters 
 In June 2004 a website developed by Greenpeace entitled exxonsecrets.com went 
online. A database compiled by Greenpeace shows that a network of loosely affiliated 
organizations, scientists and politicians, all of which are associated with climate change denial, 
have been the recipients of millions of dollars of funding from ExxonMobil. The Greenpeace 
database exposes an information warfare strategy by ExxonMobil, which is aimed at 
undermining the public’s perception of the scientific consensus on climate change. The 
Greenpeace campaign reveals information about these organizations including a description of 
the organization, the extent of their funding from ExxonMobil, dossiers of their key activities, 
key quotes, and key people such as scientists and legislators. The database is organized by a 
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series of visual maps of the different networks sponsored by ExxonMobil that are devoted to 
climate change denial. This includes a map of key academics and their links with ExxonMobil 
and its network of think tanks, key congressmen and their links to ExxonMobil, and a map of 
major lobbyists and their links with climate scepticism and ExxonMobil. To add legitimacy to 
these maps, the sources of its information are all available from drop-down menus (see Table 2 
for a visual example).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
This analysis reveals the existence of a distributed network of climate change deniers and 
sceptics all funded by ExxonMobil, devoted to producing a pseudo-science that is not validated 
using established scientific methods and peer-review, and is designed to undermine the 
perception of the scientific consensus on climate change (See Figure 2). Further, the 
government-corporate interface is also mapped ostensibly for the purpose of applying political 
pressure to legislators over their association with organizations implicated in ExxonMobil’s 
funding of organizations sceptical of climate science knowledge claims. Greenpeace (2006) 
found that ExxonMobil has paid $3.5 million to 49 different organizations all of which actively 
campaigned against policies to address global warming in the year 2005. Subsequent research 
into this elaborate network of funding revealed that Exxon has paid out over $22 million to the 
climate change denial industry since 1998 (Greenpeace, 2007). Greenpeace explained that the 
purpose of their own ‘map’ is to aid journalists, researchers, policy makers and concerned 
citizens in their understanding of the complex funding relations that underpin the research of 
the climate change sceptics, and to show that this research is not independent science.  
In response to Greenpeace’s information tactics, ExxonMobil began a PR campaign 
using the mainstream press to argue that the groups they were funding are varied and are not 
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necessarily climate change deniers, stating that ‘The groups Greenpeace cites are a widely 
varied group and to classify them as “climate deniers” is wrong,’ and that ‘We believe that 
climate change is a serious issue and that action is warranted now.’ ExxonMobil explained 
their own campaign of funding these groups as ‘an unfortunate distraction’ (Business Week 23 
April 2007). Greenpeace’s campaign against ExxonMobil gained political currency in the 
United States when North Carolina House of Representative Brad Miller stated to the press 
that: ‘The support of climate sceptics, many of whom have no real grounding in climate 
science, appears to be an effort to distort public discussion about global warming. So long as 
popular discussion could be about whether warming was occurring or not, so long as doubt was 
widespread, consensus for action could be postponed’ (Fox News, 17 May 2007).    
 
v) ExxonMobil exerts legal pressure to close communication 
 Following an IRS (Internal Revenue Service) audit of Greenpeace in the US in 2005, 
Greenpeace alleged that ExxonMobil had abused its political clout and prompted the audit. 
This phase of their dispute began when the IRS was contacted by the PIW (Public Interest 
Watch), which was set up in 2002 as a watchdog for charitable organizations. Its founder, 
Michael Hardiman, was a Washington-based lobbyist and public-relations consultant who had 
also worked for a Republican congressman. The PIW alleged in a report attached to their letter 
to the IRS that Greenpeace was abusing its tax-exempt status and engaging in the money 
laundering of more than US$24 million by diverting it to protest groups and criminal activities. 
In September 2005, the IRS conducted a month long audit of Greenpeace, declaring in March 
of 2006 that it could remain tax-exempt from federal income tax. On March 21st, 2006, the 
Wall Street Journal ran a story on PIW’s federal tax filing revealing that US$120,000 of its 
US$124,094 income in 2003/4 had come from ExxonMobil. A subsequent investigation by 
journalists at Business Week found that the PIW was itself prompted by the public relations 
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firm Dezenhall Resources to contact the IRS and accuse Greenpeace of fraud (Business Week 
17 April 2006). The same Business Week article noted that Dezenhall were renowned for their 
work on crisis management and for their highly controversial clients, most notably Jeffrey 
Skilling during the collapse of Enron.  
 
vi) ExxonMobil’s Promotion of ‘Counter-science’ 
  A key tactic employed by ExxonMobil was the funding of a network of experts, all of 
which disputed the existence of climate change. The task of this network of Exxon sponsored 
NGOs was to produce what might be described as a ‘counter-science’ which was generally 
favourable to its sponsors (Beck, 1999). The role of counter-science in the present case is 
highlighted by the subsequent involvement of other important NGOs, most notably the Royal 
Society, which is one of the world’s oldest and most august scientific communities. In 
September of 2006, the Royal Society sent a letter to ExxonMobil about its funding of various 
groups which deny climate change and attempt to undermine the existing scientific research. 
This letter criticized ExxonMobil both for the content of its own Corporate Citizenship Report 
and for its funding of various groups that have sought to undermine the public’s perception of 
scientific research into climate change. The letter described ExxonMobil’s report on corporate 
citizenship as ‘not consistent with the scientific literature that has been published on this issue 
[i.e. climate change]’ (Ward, 2006). The Royal Society criticized ExxonMobil in precisely the 
terms of the risk society (Beck, 1992, 1999), observing that the company was ‘overstating the 
amount and significance of uncertainty in knowledge’ and that there were misrepresentations 
of risk in its annual reports, particularly the subsection of its Report on Corporate Citizenship 
which purported to outline ‘Uncertainty and Risk.’ The letter goes on to criticize ExxonMobil 
on the grounds that ExxonMobil has been funding organizations that had been ‘misinforming 
the public about the science of climate change…. some 39 [of these] organizations were 
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featuring information on their websites that misapprehended the science of climate change.’ 
The Royal Society described Exxon’s presentation of environmental issues variously as 
‘inaccurate,’ as ‘misleading,’ and as a ‘denial of the evidence’ (Ward, 2006).  
The relationship between the media, lobbyists, politics and the scientific community 
has been strained over this issue, and the scientists themselves have rarely been so outspoken 
on a scientific matter. In an open letter published in May of 2010, members of the US National 
Academy of Sciences framed this ‘debate’ over climate change in the following language: 
‘We… call for an end to McCarthy-like threats of criminal prosecution against our colleagues 
based on innuendo and guilt by association, the harassment of scientists by politicians seeking 
distractions to avoid taking action, and the outright lies being spread about them’ (The 
Guardian 6 May 2010). This portrayal of the debate by the scientists themselves highlights the 
somewhat unscientific manner in which the debate is being conducted, showing instead the 
significant role that misinformation, distractions and threats have played in its development.  
Another important aspect of the promotion of a counter-science was the use of advertising in 
mainstream media such as the New York Times, where climate science was compared with 
meteorology, a supposedly uncertain science whose predictions were portrayed as being 
unreliable (Livesey, 2002). The crucial issue of the role of science in information warfare and 
its implications for the ways in which organizations seek to manage the perception of risks will 
be examined in further detail in the discussion section (See table 3 below for the ExxonMobil-
Greenpeace dispute timeline). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     In sum, both ExxonMobil and Greenpeace are employing information warfare 
strategies and counter-strategies. While ExxonMobil has been bankrolling a distributed 
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network of organizations and people, posing as experts on climate change and publicizing its 
own ‘counter-science’ in opposition to that of mainstream climate science, Greenpeace has 
been countering with an information campaign of their own. We will now identify the precise 
informational tactics that were employed by each organization and discuss the similarities and 
differences between the general strategic approaches of each organization before finally 
evaluating the extent to which we can understand this conflict as a form of information 
warfare. 
 
Discussion: Information Warfare in Action 
 
The case study of this dispute that we described above involved a number of tactics that 
ExxonMobil and Greenpeace employed in their strategies to disseminate a particular 
understanding of the climate change debate at the same time as undermining the position of 
their adversaries. In terms of information warfare, these kinds of tactics are about the ‘remote 
guidance of confusion’ and about forms of war about knowledge of ourselves and the world 
around us (see Table 1). For ExxonMobil the primary target of their campaigns was the public 
perception of climate science, where the reputation of Greenpeace was a secondary but 
significant target of this campaign. The primary methods for accomplishing their aims were the 
use of advertising in the mass media and in their own corporate citizenship documents. The 
tactics of Exxonmobil included the following: 
Tactic I - The propagation and framing of confusion: ExxonMobil funded the industry 
lobby group, the Global Climate Coalition, which framed the debate in terms preferred by 
the company.  This lobby group was established to target the public’s perception of 
climate change and sow confusion about the relevant climate science in the media and in 
government.  
 33
Tactic II – The creation of a science of denial: ExxonMobil sponsored a diffuse network 
of NGOs all of which are in some part dedicated to climate change denial. This network 
is more than simply a lobby group and is associated with the promulgation of a ‘counter-
science’ that drew on expert opinions from outside the realm of climate science for 
validation, notably from economics. This campaign has been described by prominent 
scientific groups, such as the Royal Society, as being an attempt to mislead and confuse 
the public. 
Tactic III – Corporate Citizenship Reports and Traditional PR: ExxonMobil used its own 
public relations materials and corporate citizenship reports to continue its disinformation 
campaign. These reports contained statements denying the risks associated with climate 
change, again distorting basic scientific facts, where the company’s prime target was its 
own shareholders. In their 2005 Corporate Citizenship Report, ExxonMobil openly 
rejected the prevailing scientific consensus, stating that, ‘Opposition to the Kyoto 
Protocol does not equate to a lack of concern about the environment or the issue of 
climate change.’ However, after the intervention of the Royal Society on this issue there 
are no further direct references to the Kyoto Protocol in these reports in subsequent years. 
In addition to these reports that were circulated to shareholders and posted on the Web, 
ExxonMobil also sponsored a costly advertising campaign. Livesey’s (2002, p.140) 
analysis of a series of advertisements commissioned by ExxonMobil for the New York 
Times has shown that such tactics were used to ‘control meanings related to the issue of 
climate change’ against activist groups and in favour of the oil company. Its aggressive 
advertising campaign disseminated disinformation regarding the Kyoto Protocol in an 
attempt to confuse the terms of the debate. For instance one advertising campaign 
proclaimed, ‘Carbon dioxide: they call it pollution. We call it life.’  
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Tactic IV- Discrediting Greenpeace: ExxonMobil employed legal measures against 
Greenpeace in an attempt to discredit the NGO’s status as a reliable source of 
information. Greenpeace was a secondary target of ExxonMobil’s overall campaign 
targeting climate science, but as a key player in the public debate it was clearly important 
to undermine the credibility of this influential adversary. ExxonMobil did this by direct 
and indirect means, by suing Greenpeace on numerous occasions for ‘logo abuse’ (BBC, 
25th June, 2002) and indirectly by prompting an IRS audit of Greenpeace.  
 
We can see that the ExxonMobil information campaign has used a number of traditional 
tactics (such as lawsuits, PR campaigns in traditional media, political connections, social 
networks, and institutional insiders including people who can be made to look like insiders 
within the field of climate science) in combination with technologically-enhanced tactics 
(development of corporate/ NGO websites and net campaigns). We should also note that whilst 
its sponsorship of a network of apparently unrelated NGOs devoted to the denial of climate 
change was an innovative tactic, on the whole this campaign used traditional methods of 
propaganda. This campaign was designed less to present a fully developed scientific 
perspective on climate change than it was to confuse the public and undermine its 
understanding of the existing scientific consensus. 
Like ExxonMobil, the primary target of the Greenpeace campaign was the public’s 
perception of climate science. However, the Greenpeace campaign was much more explicitly 
targeted against ExxonMobil as its key adversary. The informational tactics of their campaign 
included the following: 
Tactic I: The propagation of imagery and mindbombs: Greenpeace staged high profile 
events to create spectacular images that attracted media attention and highlighted 
environmental concerns. This was targeted at the public in general and at ExxonMobil 
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shareholders in particular. This campaign circulated images of environmental destruction 
in the media and at ExxonMobil shareholder meetings. The circulation of images, or 
‘mindbombs’ played a prominent aspect of the conflict, particularly in the Greenpeace 
campaign. The campaign directly targeted the reputation of ExxonMobil and its brand, 
producing highly emotive parodies of the ExxonMobil public relations material and its 
corporate logo.  
Tactic II – Discrediting ExxonMobil: In addition to the circulation of affective imagery, 
Greenpeace made significant use of slogans as a means of propagating their message 
throughout the alternative media and the mass media, such as naming CEO of Exxon 
Mobil as the ‘No.1 climate criminal’ in a variety of media channels. Greenpeace also 
developed reports spoofing the industry version of events and high profile protests at 
company shareholder meetings which gathered widespread coverage on the Internet and 
in the mass media. 
Tactic III – Forms of Hactivism: Greenpeace made extensive use of alternative media in 
the spread of their own propaganda, both in the dissemination of scientific knowledge 
about climate change and in directed attacks on the reputation of ExxonMobil. 
Greenpeace launched a cyber-activist campaign that explicitly targeted ExxonMobil, 
which included an email campaign (see 
http://archive.greenpeace.org/cyberstory/cyberactivism.htm) and the development of a 
website, Exxonsecrets.org in order to reveal and thus discredit ExxonMobil’s own 
campaign. This latter tactic was specifically designed to counter the campaign of 
misinformation and confusion that was being employed by ExxonMobil. This may be 
seen as being a particularly innovative tactic in that it revealed “the map” on which its 
adversary’s campaign was based. 
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Greenpeace also made use of lo-tech tactics such as the traditional mass media and PR 
stunts in its campaign; however, with far less resources at its disposal, its campaign is 
characterized by a more sophisticated use of alternative media and cyberspace in its attacks 
upon the reputation and credibility of ExxonMobil.  
 These tactics demonstrate that prior to any ‘negotiations’ concerning the governance of 
climate change, such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol or the 2009 UN climate summit at 
Copenhagen, there is an intense information warfare campaign being undertaken by key 
stakeholders in order to attack the frames of their adversaries and to promote and defend their 
own framing of this controversial issue. This exceeds the bounds of conventional framing 
identified in, for instance, the discursive politics and institutional entrepreneurship literatures 
referred to earlier (e.g. Clemons & Cook, 1999; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Levy & Scully, 2007; Maguire et al. 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Phillips et al. 2004) in a 
number of respects. Most obviously we extend extant literatures in organizational theory by 
directing attention towards the explicit and hostile use of information as a disruptive weapon 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997a; Terranova, 2007), but also with respect to the increasing use of 
informational networks and forms of hactivism that bypass the traditional mass media. We also 
emphasize such strategies as the promotion of a counter-science to confuse a given target by 
destabilizing information sources and thereby either challenging or defending incumbent 
hegemonies (Beck, 1992; Virilio, 2000). 
  In addition, our analysis extends existing work on frames within social movement 
organizational theory (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005). We do this by 
demonstrating that the ability to create a frame that resonates with the public is not just a 
matter of winning a democratic debate with superior arguments or by refutation of opposing 
positions by, for instance, presenting scientific evidence. As our case study illustrates, ‘framing 
contests’ can be highly combative (Carragee and Roefs, 2004), where the parties involved 
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utilize a number of disruptive informational tactics to improve their position and undermine 
that of their adversaries. In our case study, we show that informational tactics were used by 
both ExxonMobil and Greenpeace to build partisan frames and to attack the frames of one 
another. In such framing contests, science itself becomes both a weapon used to further 
organizational interests, and a target of deliberate deception, disruption, manipulation and even 
outright sabotage in a war of positioning. In debates over such issues as climate change, such 
tactics are rarely transparent, and form a shadowy and sometimes pernicious presence that can 
prove decisive in whether social movement organizations either succeed or fail to achieve their 
strategic objectives.   
The informational tactics of ExxonMobil and Greenpeace share a number of 
commonalities as forms of information warfare, but they also exhibit some important 
differences. Both organizations make extensive use of communications networks in the pursuit 
of their goals, including the traditional media, such as newspapers, television and the business 
press and alternative media such as Internet websites, blogs and emails. Both organizations 
make appeal to the scientific aspect of the debate and seek to engage experts they consider to 
be relevant to support their respective positions. Both organizations have directly attacked the 
other’s reliability as a credible source of information, not only by making reference to the 
scientific expertise, but also by directly attacking the reputation of the organization itself.  
 There are also a number of important differences between the tactics of ExxonMobil 
and those of Greenpeace. The Greenpeace tactics have tended to work through increased 
transparency of the scientific consensus, whereas the ExxonMobil tactics attempted to 
undermine the public’s perception that such a consensus really existed. This issue of 
transparency has also been apparent in ExxonMobil’s funding of a loosely connected network 
of NGOs with the common purpose of denying the existence of climate change. This tactic 
concerned the ‘remote guidance of confusion’ aimed at disrupting the counter-hegemonic 
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efforts of environmental NGOs to mobilize the public against the oil industry and the 
prevailing hegemonic order. The links between this network and ExxonMobil only became 
publicized in the maps that were developed for the Greenpeace website Exxonsecrets.org. In 
general, Greenpeace made far more use of non-mainstream media such as the mobilization of 
cyber-activists and Internet websites to disseminate information about climate science and to 
attack the reputation of its adversaries and their information sources. In contrast, ExxonMobil 
stuck to more traditional media outlets especially TV and newspaper advertising. Furthermore, 
whereas Greenpeace referred to the expertise of climate science, ExxonMobil tended to make 
little use of this field preferring instead to use experts from the network of NGOs that they 
funded, who were largely associated with the field of economics and politics rather than 
climate science. In Beck’s (1992) terminology, they were engaged in the promulgation of a 
‘counter-science’ in which the risks of their own operations were portrayed as being minimal. 
The consistent attempts to undermine the idea of a scientific consensus met with overt protests 
from several prestigious scientific bodies including London’s Royal Society, the Union of 
Concerned Scientists and the US National Academy of Sciences.    
 The enlistment of different groups of experts and intellectuals is a particularly 
prominent aspect of this case study. Gramsci’s (1971) early work on social conflict identified 
the crucial role that ‘organic’ intellectuals played in the formation of hegemony, where he 
described their role not only in terms of knowledge production but also as being organizers and 
‘permanent persuaders’. More recently, Terranova (2007) has observed that reference to 
intellectuals and high profile experts is a key tactic in modern hegemonic struggles and that 
these authorities may be drawn upon in the circulation of images and slogans in the 
formulation of information warfare campaigns. The ExxonMobil/Greenpeace case study 
provides a very clear example of this tactic. The role of the Royal Society has particular 
relevance within this analysis, since their intervention serves to highlight the fact that this 
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debate is not simply a technical disagreement between scientists, but that a ‘counter science’ is 
being produced by lobbyists rather than experts in pertinent scientific disciplines such as 
climatology, biology, meteorology and oceanography. The role of the counter-science is to 
bring in other possible explanations for the causes of the risks we face and thus dissolve 
responsibility for them amongst these competing explanations (Beck, 1992, 1999). 
ExxonMobil has had an uneasy relationship with climate change scientists, even those in its 
own employ. Some years after the industry lobby group, the Global Climate Coalition, was 
disbanded The New York Times uncovered evidence that showed that their own scientific 
advisors had counselled them that ‘the potential impact of human emissions of greenhouse 
gases such as CO2 on climate is well established and cannot be denied’ (The New York Times 
24 April 2009), but they chose to ignore this advice and focused only on those snippets of 
doubt that could be used in the effort to undermine public perceptions.  
Recent findings published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
(Anderegg et al. 2010) have shown that the public perception of climate change is widely at 
odds with the scientific consensus, suggesting that the tactics of climate change sceptics such 
as ExxonMobil and its industry lobbyists have been broadly successful. Having said that, there 
is a great deal of national variation in the perception of this important issue, where Europeans 
tend to be less sceptical than those in the United States, but still with a significant proportion of 
public opinion at odds with the scientific consensus (The New York Times, 4th January 2007). 
The tactics of Greenpeace have met with only limited success. On the one hand they have been 
broadly successful in bringing the issue of climate change to the public’s attention, but on the 
other hand, the evidence from Anderegg et al. (2010) would suggest that the information 
campaign of ExxonMobil has been even more successful, at least when judged at this moment 
in time, where a large proportion of public have chosen to doubt the scientific consensus. 
When weighing up who might be the final victor in this struggle it is worth considering Levy’s 
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(2008, p.956) observation that ‘the long term nature of a war of position makes it difficult to 
evaluate the success of challenger strategies at a given point in time’. In the case of climate 
change, these strategies have profoundly affected the way in which the public debate about 
climate science has been framed and the way in which we orientate ourselves in the world 
around us. The different strategies, tactics and targets identified in the information warfare 
campaigns described above are summarized in Table 4 below.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4 illustrates the different methods employed by each organization for the circulation of 
images and slogans to mobilize support for their respective positions, as well as reference to 
scientific expertise to legitimate their claims. Table 4 also highlights the means by which the 
information sources of each organization have been subject to attack.  
          This informational attack happens in two key respects. Firstly, it happens by means of 
attacks on the information itself with, for instance, the creation of a ‘counter-science’, which 
denies the existence of man-made climate change. Secondly, it happens by means of an attack 
on the reliability of the information source, such as Greenpeace’s development of the 
Exxonsecrets.org website to expose the network of lobbyists against climate change. The 
tactics used in the information campaigns of these two organizations are clear examples of 
'netwars' insomuch as they aim to ‘disrupt, damage or modify what a target population knows 
or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it’ (Denning, 1999, p.73). The findings of 
this case would support Terranova’s (2004, 2007) assertion that the network culture more 
resembles a battlefield than a democratic forum in which issues are decided by consensus. 
While it is true that a certain amount of negotiation takes place between the various parties 
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involved in this war of position, there also appear to be a variety of tactics used for the 
purposes of deception and disruption in the framing of the climate change debate itself.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 Novel informational tactics are currently transforming organizational landscapes in 
diverse social domains, such as those that have been described in the present inquiry into the 
ExxonMobil-Greenpeace dispute, as well other fields such as the open source file-sharing 
communities, which have had profound effects on the music and software industries and the 
recent Wikileaks phenomenon whose affects have yet to be fully gauged. In this article we 
have sought to explain how certain organizations are reacting to the challenges posed by 
climate change. In doing so, we make an empirical contribution to our understanding of the 
climate change debate by developing a case study of the informational tactics employed by two 
high profile organizations in their competing attempts to influence the public perception of 
climate change. We also make a conceptual contribution by reworking the neo-Gramscian 
concept of a ‘war of position’ in terms consistent with emerging theories of information 
warfare. Our analysis goes beyond an emphasis on how hegemony is achieved through 
negotiations between different interest groups to incorporate the role of directed attacks using 
information warfare tactics against the sources of information that are drawn upon by these 
different interest groups in the framing of the climate change debate.  
We do not claim that all organizations employ such information and disinformation 
strategies and tactics, but that such tactics are clearly evident in the ExxonMobil-Greenpeace 
dispute over climate change. The findings of this study suggest that ExxonMobil has embarked 
on a deliberate campaign of confusion and disinformation producing a counter-science to 
manufacture public uncertainty by funding a diffuse network of ideologically driven advocacy 
organizations, as well as other issues management, public relations, lobbying and legal tactics. 
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In contrast, Greenpeace has employed a counterstrategy of exposing the hidden networks 
funded by ExxonMobil in addition to continuing its own campaign to highlight environmental 
issues using diverse media including Internet websites, cyber-activism and the traditional 
media to plant their ‘mind-bombs’. Each organization attempts to disrupt the positions of the 
other within their informational and semiotic business environment, at the same time as 
targeting the public’s perception of climate change.  
 Our analysis opens up the question as to the extent that business organizations and 
activist NGOs employ informational tactics in pursuit of their strategic aims. Further research 
might explore the diversity of informational weapons that corporations and NGOs use not only 
to influence their various stakeholders, but also to frame relevant debates in their favour and to 
disrupt and disorientate the activities of their adversaries. With specific reference to the climate 
change debate, the impact of such informational tactics might also be investigated in terms of 
its wider impact on public perception and public policy. The present paper limited itself to an 
analysis of the informational tactics of Greenpeace and ExxonMobil; however, there were 
other important events in the faming of this debate that have yet to be subject to rigorous 
academic analysis. For instance, a subsequent event of similar importance in the evolution of 
the climate change debate has been the ‘Climategate’ controversy regarding the theft, 
mischaracterization and dissemination of emails from the University of East Anglia’s Climatic 
Research Unit in 2009, which were released into the blogosphere immediately preceding the 
Copenhagen climate summit in what appears to be a further attempt to attack and undermine 
the research being done by climate scientists (see Muir, 2010). Yet another incident in this 
debate has been the Heartland affair, in which climate scientist Peter Gleick solicited 
documents from the Heartland Institute in 2012 outlining their strategy for discrediting climate 
change science. Gleick then released these documents to the media and into the blogosphere. 
While the media focus of this affair has been the status of Gleick’s ethical conduct in obtaining 
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the documents, the content of these documents outlines a multi-million dollar campaign of 
asymmetric information warfare waged by the Heartland Institute (Heartland also being one of 
the key organizations identified by Greenpeace in its Exxonsecrets website as having received 
funding from ExxonMobil between the years 1998 and 2006). The documents reveal, for 
instance, efforts to have climate change denial embedded in school curricula in the United 
States (see Gleick, 2012). Controversies involving the Heartland Institute’s information war 
against climate change science also include a recent advertising campaign claiming, “most 
prominent advocates of global warming aren't scientists. They are murderers, tyrants, and 
madmen” (Heartland, 2012). 
An editorial in the scientific journal Nature has stated pointedly that the climate change 
debate has become a ‘street fight’ involving tactics such as those that we have outlined in this 
article, which are often incompatible with traditional notions of scientific inquiry (Lewis 2010, 
p.7; Nature 11th March 2010). Such informational attacks, we argue, are becoming prominent 
features of new organizational landscapes. Extending the neo-Gramscian perspective on social 
movement theory drawing on concepts from information warfare implies a privileging of ends 
over means where ‘anything goes’ including a willingness to distort information, discredit 
opponents, deceive, exaggerate, hack into computers, mobilize supporters, use satire and 
perhaps even methods of deliberate sabotage such as crashing websites, disseminating viruses 
and so on, all of which warrant further investigation in organization studies. 
Taking a somewhat different tack, this kind of approach might also be fruitfully applied 
to areas of study that are concerned with intangible resources such as corporate brands like 
those of ExxonMobil, Greenpeace, the IPCC, the CEI and other ‘players’ discussed in this 
article. In the analysis presented here we have only touched on the semiotics involved in how 
these organizations have sought to manipulate their business environment, choosing instead to 
focus upon the various informational tactics that each has employed; further research could 
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investigate whether particular semiotic strategies are linked to particular forms of information 
warfare (the work of Terranova, 2007 has already made some moves in this direction). With 
the increasing significance of information technologies such as the Internet in newly emerging 
organizational landscapes, we are likely to see much more of these kinds of strategies and 
tactics, from both businesses and NGOs, in the future. 
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Table 1: The doctrine of information warfare 
  
Use of Information 
as  a Weapon 
Definition of Information Warfare 
 
 
Confusion 
‘Information warfare is … not just the guidance of missiles 
using ‘electronic warfare’ techniques, but the remote 
guidance of confusion.’ (Virilio, 2000a, p.49) 
  
 
Disruption 
Damage 
Manipulation 
‘Operations [of cyber war] will attempt to disrupt, damage, 
or modify what a target population knows or thinks it know 
about itself and the world around it.’ (Denning, 1999, p.73) 
  
 
 
‘It [netwar] means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify 
what a target population “knows” or thinks it knows about 
itself and the world around it.’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
1997b, p.28) 
  
 
 
Knowledge of self 
and adversaries  
‘Both netwar and cyber war revolve around information 
and communications matters, at a deeper level they are 
forms of war about ‘knowledge’ - about who knows what, 
when, where, and why, and about how secure a society or a 
military is regarding its knowledge of itself and its 
adversaries.’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997b, p.27) 
  
 
Disorganizing 
‘… radically different models must be considered that 
focus upon the objective of systematically disorganizing 
the enemy.’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997b, p.39) 
  
 
 
 
Knowledge of self 
and adversaries 
‘Netwar generally involves seeking “top sight” (total 
intelligence) about one’s own and the opponent’s situation, 
while keeping that opponent in the dark about oneself and 
about its own situation. Netwar means affecting what the 
opponent knows, or thinks it knows, not only about its 
challenger but also about itself and the world around it.’ 
(Ronfeldt & Martinez, 1997, p.373-374) 
  
 
Shock 
Surprise 
Disorientation 
 
‘In some cases we may have to introduce shock, surprise 
and terror in an adversary’s external world… to fuel the 
nightmares and disorientation sought in the enemy’s 
internal world.’ (Szafranski, 1997, p.408). 
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Table 2: Exemplar Dossier: the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62
Table 3: ExxonMobil-Greenpeace climate change dispute timeline 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Information Warfare Strategies and Tactics  
 
 Greenpeace ExxonMobil 
   
      Strategy   
   
 Campaigning to protect and 
conserve the environment through 
the deployment of ‘mind bombs’ – 
the deployment of powerful images 
through the world’s media. 
A disinformation campaign to 
manufacture uncertainty 
through the creation and 
dissemination of a ‘counter-
science’ 
   
       Tactics   
   
Use of Networks • Lobbying governments 
• Direct action by activists 
• Disruptive image events 
• Army of online cyber-activists 
• Funding network of climate 
denial NGO network 
• Lobbying governments 
• Setting up arms-length PR 
companies 
Attack/Defense of 
Information Sources 
• Exposure by means of  
 Exxonsecrets.org website  
• Use of Internet websites to  
 disseminate information about  
 the polluting operations of  
• Employment of a network of 
counter experts that deny the 
evidence of the scientific 
consensus 
• Publish misinformation in 
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 ExxonMobil 
• The deployment of powerful  
 images through the world’s  
 media 
• Exploiting cyberspace to  
 circumvent mainstream media  
 
annual reports and corporate 
PR 
• Finance advertising campaigns 
denying climate change using 
mainstream media  
Attack/Defense of  
the Reputation of 
Sources  
• Parodies of ExxonMobil PR     
 material and corporate logo 
• Staging spectacular events, such  
 as open confrontations and public 
 protests  
 
• Use of litigation against 
Greenpeace 
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